The CIA and Covert Operations: To Disclose or Not to Disclose - That is the Question by Eyth, Marcus
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 3
5-1-2002
The CIA and Covert Operations: To Disclose or
Not to Disclose - That is the Question
Marcus Eyth
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the National Security Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marcus Eyth, The CIA and Covert Operations: To Disclose or Not to Disclose - That is the Question, 17 BYU J. Pub. L. 45 (2002).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol17/iss1/3
EYTH-MACRO 2/5/2003 9:49 AM 
 
45 
The CIA and Covert Operations: To Disclose or Not to 
Disclose – That is the Question 
Marcus Eyth* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When the president does it, that means it is not illegal.1 
President Richard M. Nixon 
If Mr. Nixon’s statement were unconditionally true, many United 
States citizens would presumably find the very pillars upon which the 
United States was founded to have been significantly shaken, and some 
might even consider a permanent move to another country.  With respect 
to the implications this statement has upon the president’s discretion in 
conducting covert operations without first consulting Congress, some 
scholars would opt to reach for pen and paper.2 
The issue of whether Congress and the executive branch must share 
the power to authorize and conduct covert activities, or whether it may 
be unilaterally exercised by the CIA, under the direction of the National 
Security Council (NSC), has become ripe for critique since Congress 
took significant steps to reign-in the discretion of the executive which for 
nearly two centuries enjoyed virtually carte blanche authority in this 
area.  Initially, Congress arguably acquiesced through its actions (i.e., 
appropriating funds with a somewhat laissez-faire attitude)3 to covert 
operations which were conducted with significant executive discretion 
until the beginning of the Second World War. However, the creation of 
the CIA in 1947 served as a wake-up call for the United States, not only 
 
* Copyright © 2003, Marcus Eyth, Staff Attorney, Claims Resolution Tribunal, Zurich Switzerland; 
LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 2002; J.D., Gonzaga University School of Law, 2001; 
B.A., University of Vermont, 1996. 
 1. Excerpts from Interview with Nixon about Domestic Effects of Indochina War, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 20, 1977, at A16 (interview by David Frost) available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, NY 
Times File. 
 2. Or more appropriately, keyboard and screen. 
 3. Ray S. Cline, Covert Action as Presidential Prerogative, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
357, 358 (1989).  For example, from 1790-93, George Washington “requested and received [up to 
$1,000,000] from the new Congress for the purpose of conducting secret intelligence activity” 
through a “Contingent Fund for Foreign Recourse” without having to name the agents involved. Id. 
EYTH-MACRO 2/5/2003  9:49 AM 
46 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume XVII 
to officially recognize the need for covert operations, but to engage in a 
discussion about whether American interests are best served by 
excluding or limiting Congress from taking part in decisions to proceed 
with covert operations. 
Congress cast its vote through the legislation it enacted.  Based on 
the fundamental argument of needing to preserve the underlying values 
of democracy via government checks and balances, Congress passed 
applicable legislation with the objective of overseeing executive conduct 
in this arena by requiring the CIA—absent exigent circumstances—to 
report decisions to commence covert operations to congressional 
committees within a reasonable time before actually proceeding.  Though 
this argument appears fair and reasonable at first glance, the practical 
realities are not as clear-cut, as there are legitimate reasons why it may 
be in the best interest of the United States—and more importantly, the 
interests of the individual agents involved—not to disclose that covert 
operations will be conducted. This is at least a legitimate concern of the 
Executive until the safety of the men and women involved is secured. 
This Article considers why, at least in some situations, the Executive 
should have the option not to report planned or ongoing covert 
operations to Congress, even though such conduct may conflict with the 
democratic idealist view of preserving democratic principles at all costs. 
Part II of this Article examines the history of general covert activity 
in the United States, touching upon colonial times and subsequently 
discussing the two eras during which most covert operations were 
conducted: the Cold War and the War on Terrorism.  Part III defines 
covert operations in terms of types that are used. Additionally, Part III 
describes the legislative development, scope and authority of covert 
activities as defined in law and via executive orders.  Part IV addresses 
whether unilaterally conducted covert operations fail, by their very 
nature, to conform to democratic principles, and consequently result in 
constitutional violations, or whether there are circumstances under which 
the Executive has the authority to preempt or circumvent legislation 
which effectively limits the President’s authority.  Part V concludes the 
Article. 
II.  A HISTORY OF COVERT ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  Colonial Times: The Origins of Covert Actions 
While the debate over the legitimacy of United States covert action 
with limited or no congressional review is a relatively recent theme 
addressed in Congress, in the press, and in classrooms, American covert 
activities have a long history.  During colonial times, there was no 
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dispute about the need for secret political activities in pursuit of 
international goals—activities which today would be considered covert 
operations.4  In the late eighteenth century alone, colonial political 
leaders like George Washington (and almost every president to follow) 
secretly appointed a total of 400 special agents to conduct activities with 
or against foreign countries.5  They later justified the non-disclosure to 
other branches of government by explaining that Congress simply 
consisted of too many members to be able to keep a secret.6  For 
example, in 1843 President Tyler attempted to influence public opinion 
in England about relations between the United States and Great Britain 
by sending an agent to meet secretly with English government leaders.7  
President Grant also decided to send an agent to Canada in 1869 to 
“foment sentiment” in central and western Canada to separate from 
Canada and join the United States.8  The potential for leakage illustrates 
one of the key arguments in favor of limiting congressional knowledge 
of such activities. 
The activities conducted to extract intelligence and secretly influence 
citizens, officials, and events in foreign countries by leaders of the pre-
constitutional era are strikingly similar to those used today, though, not 
surprisingly, attained with less sophisticated means.  Eighteenth century 
covert activity ran the gamut “from non-attributable propaganda and 
psychological warfare to the opening of mail and the recruitment of 
secret agents of influence.”9 
In drafting the Constitution, the Framers recognized that the creation 
of a strong executive branch was imperative to maintain a balance of 
powers and thus conferred significant responsibility upon the president, 
not only to operate as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but as 
the entity in charge of foreign policy as well.  The first president did not 
take long to make use of his broadly defined powers with respect to 
covert operations, when, between 1790 and 1793, he requested and 
received appropriations exceeding one million dollars for conducting 
 
 4. See id. at 357. 
 5. See U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Risks and Control of Foreign Intelligence: 
Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong. 1729, 1731-33 (1976) 
hereinafter Hearing (statement of Mitchell Rogovin, Special Counsel to the Director of the CIA). 
 6. See 50th Cong., 1st Session., Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United 
States (Oct. 1, 1776), Serial Set 2585 (1889).  See also STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL 
SECURITY LAW 419 (2d ed. 1997) (“The need for secrecy in conducting diplomatic affairs was 
recognized by the Congress in 1790 when $40,000 was appropriated in an account for the president 
‘for the support of such persons as he shall commission to serve the United States in foreign parts.’”) 
 7. Hearing, supra note 5, at 1732-33. 
 8. Id. at 1733. 
 9. Cline, supra note 3, at 357. 
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secret intelligence activity, including covert and clandestine operations.10  
Though no relevant legislation was passed into law for more than a 
century, members of Congress seemed satisfied with this type of less 
formal arrangement and acknowledged and respected the need for covert 
operations without requiring the president to reveal the identities of the 
agents or the activities involved.  Despite the potential concerns about 
violating basic democratic norms through this type of congressional 
acquiescence,11 a standard was thereby recognized early-on in the U.S. 
government.  Following the successful formation of the United States, 
covert operations became less of a priority throughout the nineteenth 
century and first half of the twentieth century, at least in comparison to 
the amount of covert activities conducted in the latter half of the 20th 
Century through the present. 
B.   The Cold War Era and the Birth of the CIA 
Why it took more than a century and a half for the United States to 
become more closely attuned to the existence of—and need for—
proficient covert operations may be explained by the fact that the United 
States was virtually isolated from world affairs until it entered the 
Second World War.  Covert operations were not a priority, especially 
since the U.S. geographic disposition seemed to provide—at least to the 
public—a sense of insulation from military threats abroad.12  However, 
the United States was rudely awakened from its complacency by the 
Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. 
Though secret diplomacy had certainly existed even where 
international threats were virtually non-existent and the need to conduct 
international affairs was less of a priority, the U.S. government quickly 
recognized the legitimate threat to American sovereignty and 
consequently established the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.), the 
first “central coordinating intelligence agency.”13  Following the defeat 
of Hitler and the German Reich in 1945, the O.S.S. disclosed that the 
United States had conducted behind-the-scenes “political and 
paramilitary operations” as a means to secure German defeat. These 
activities were largely condoned by the public, especially in light of the 
successful nature of the operations which played a role in securing 
 
 10. Id. at 358. The same privilege was given to the Director of Central Intelligence in 1949. 
See 50 U.S.C. § 403j(b) (1994). 
 11. DYCUS ET AL., supra note 6, at 400 ([T]he Framers realized that [the capability of the 
president to keep matters secret] posed a threat to the democratic concept of accountability.”). 
 12. Id. at 395 (“[U]se of private forces to achieve military goals had fallen into disuse by the 
mid-nineteenth century . . . .”). 
 13. See Cline, supra note 3, at 358. 
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European and world independence from fascism and later from 
communism.14 
Although the O.S.S. was disbanded by executive order in 1945, 
Congress sensed that excessive presidential autonomy could lead to the 
potential for abuse in the covert operations arena.  In an effort to define 
the parameters of presidential authority (e.g., by precluding the Agency 
from assuming any “internal security functions,” which were to be solely 
reserved for the FBI),15 Congress passed the National Security Act in 
1947 and the Central Intelligence Agency Act in 1949.  The beginning of 
the Cold War presented an ongoing threat to democracy that helped 
legitimize the official establishment and public recognition of an 
intelligence-gathering agency.16  Though the extent to which covert 
operations are authorized under the Act is highly debated,17 history has 
shown that presidents have made extensive use of the broad language in 
the Act in conducting covert operations “[in response to] political, 
military and ideological challenges that threatened to undercut . . . [U.S.] 
dreams of a more hopeful world.”18 This, in turn, has brought covert 
operations authorized by the National Security Council (the committee 
supervising the CIA) back into the public eye.19  Consequently, in 
comparison to the pre-Cold War era, the number of publicized covert 
operations has increased manifold over the last fifty years, beginning 
with the NSC’s first top-secret report on the crisis in Italy.  In response to 
the imminent Soviet-dominated communist movement within Italy, the 
NSC directive proposed for the United States to “‘[a]ctively combat 
Communist propaganda in Italy . . . by all . . . practicable means’” 
including covert actions.20 
Due to the classified nature of many undercover operations 
conducted by the U.S. government, it is impossible to ascertain how 
many covert operations the United States has pursued over the lifetime of 
 
 14. Id. at 358-59. 
 15. See Sherri Conrad, Note, Executive Order 12,333: ‘Unleashing’ the CIA Violates the 
Leash Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 968, 971 (1985). 
 16. David Wise, Covert Operations Abroad: An Overview, in THE CIA FILE 3, 24 (Robert L. 
Borosage & John Marks eds., 1976). 
 17. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 6, at 412. (“[P]ublic legislative history of the [NSA] 
indicates that the issue of covert action was not raised during enactment.”). 
 18. See the statement made by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, 
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on current and projected national 
security threats to the United States, Feb. 5, 1997, available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/1997/dci_testimony_020597.html. 
 19. See Cline, supra note 3, at 359. 
 20. See id. at 361-62. The CIA managed to provide money and technical help to Italian party 
leaders needed to secure the election of a democratic leader. Id. 
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the country.21  However, a number of operations have surfaced through 
newspapers, magazines and other publications.  In some cases, former 
CIA employees (often disgruntled ones) have voiced their opinions 
during lectures and speeches, volunteering details of covert actions to 
which they were exposed.22 
During the forty-year period following the Second World War, there 
were few areas of the world with which the CIA was not covertly 
connected.  During the 1950s, the CIA conducted operations in Burma, 
China, the Philippines, Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, Indonesia, and Tibet.  The 
activities ran the gamut from passive roles (e.g., assisting nationalist 
Chinese troops who fled to Burma following the communist takeover), to 
more ambitious operations, such as actively organizing and directing a 
coup in Iran to dethrone Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, or 
overthrowing the Communist-dominated government of Guatemala with 
U.S. arms and a secret CIA air force.23 
The 1960s were marked by even more prevalent and publicized 
involvement in covert operations directed by the CIA in countries 
including Singapore, Cuba (the Bay of Pigs—including the secret 
training of Cuban exiles in Guatemala), Brazil, Vietnam, Chile, Congo, 
Greece, Bolivia, Laos, and Italy.24  As in the 1950s, the CIA played a 
more passive role in some operations compared to others, both in terms 
of the amount of money invested and the number of agents assigned to 
achieve the missions.  For example, “[t]he CIA spent a reported twenty 
million dollars” both to ensure that the leftist Brazilian president was 
denied control of Congress in 1962, and an additional twenty million 
dollars one year later to ensure the election of a democratic candidate in 
Chile.25  The massive number of CIA covert operations conducted during 
the Vietnam conflict are too gross in number to list individually.  
However, more than 20,500 individuals were killed during one of the 
more notorious operations to “‘neutralize’ the Vietcong”—the “Phoenix 
 
 21. Some experts estimate that the U.S. has conducted approximately “2000 operations (all 
dangerous, some absurd-like sending Fidel Castro a poisoned scuba-diving suit) designed to change 
the course of political events abroad.” Tim Weiner, For 3d Time in 21 Years, Saddam Hussein’s 
Foes Pay Price for a Foiled U.S. Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at A6, available at LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, NY Times File. 
 22. E.g., John Stockwell, The Secret Wars of the CIA, Lecture (June 1986), in 5 E J. POL. 
SCI. (Winter 2002), at http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/2897/secretwars1.html.  At the 
time his lecture was given, Stockwell was the highest-ranking CIA official ever to leave the agency 
and go public.  Id.  He ran a CIA intelligence-gathering post in Vietnam, was the task-force 
commander of the CIA’s secret war in Angola in 1975 and 1976, and was awarded the Medal of 
Merit before he resigned.  Id. 
 23. See Wise, supra note 16, at 20-21. 
 24. Id. at 21-23. 
 25. Id. at 22. However, CIA efforts to block Salvador Allende’s election six years later went 
afoul, along with the prospect of maintaining democracy in Chile. Id. 
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Program.”26 During CIA involvement in Laos (at a cost estimated by one 
author at “between ten and twenty billion dollars” over a ten-year 
period),27 the CIA not only backed political leaders to run government 
affairs to the tune of U.S. interests, but a Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee publication reported in 1971 that the CIA had maintained a 
30,000 person army operating under the direction of General Vang Pao.28  
Finally, the Iran-Contra covert operation of the late 1970s and early 
1980s to overthrow the Sandanista regime in Nicaragua (partly via 
raising money by selling U.S. arms to Iran) caused an infamous upheaval 
in Congress after the CIA’s suspect secret operation surfaced.29 
The means and techniques used to conduct operations in foreign 
countries have varied from operation to operation, while the principal 
objective—to influence the politics of other countries by secret means—
has remained the same.  Many of these secret missions have been 
consistently denied by American presidents, a practice often referred to 
as “plausible deniability.”  Examples include: 
[D]ropping of agents by parachute, support of anti-guerilla activity, 
overthrowing governments regarded as unfriendly to Western political 
or economic interests, training of secret police, training of foreign 
guerillas in the continental United States, full-scale paramilitary 
invasion, attempts to rig elections, training and financing of a secret 
army to fight a secret war, and clandestine support of friendly political 
parties.30 
With the establishment of the CIA and its corresponding legislation, the 
U.S. government recognized the need to have a United States agency that 
has the specific duty to carry out operations in support of U.S. foreign 
policy via overt and covert means abroad.  However, along with 
designating a heroic—or “fall guy”—agency which could now officially 
be held accountable for botched operations, a discussion was sparked by 
the U.S. government and the American public about the irony in 
recognizing the mysterious and covert aspects of the agency.  While the 
CIA operates to protect democratic principles around the world, the 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Fred Baufman, The President’s Secret Army: A Case Study - The CIA in Laos, 1962-
1972, in The CIA File 46, 75 (Robert L. Borosage & John Marks eds., 1976). 
 28. Wise, supra note 16, at 23. 
 29. The president authorized the CIA to spend up to nineteen million dollars for this mission.  
Paul Gumina, Title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991: Effective Covert 
Action Reform or “Business As Usual”?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 149,  168 (1992).  This mission 
was controversial, not only because of the lack of authority and consent of Congress, but also 
because the mission continued after Congress ordered it to cease (Boland II) and because the 
president directly violated the Arms Export Control Act. See id. at 170-172. 
 30. See Wise, supra note 16, at 24. 
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secret manner by which such operations are conducted fails to provide 
for an open check by other government branches regarding whether 
covert operations are in fact legitimate and in the best interest of the 
people who elect the president.31  The debate over balancing the need to 
conduct certain operations in secret with the interests of public disclosure 
is discussed in a later portion of this Article.32 
C.   Exit the Cold War, Enter the War on Terrorism 
The focus of CIA covert action shifted following the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, marked by the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in 
September of 1989.  Inasmuch as the communist threat was no longer as 
imminent, CIA activities focused on other threats, such as the ones posed 
by Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein in the 1990s and Taliban leader Osama 
bin Laden beginning in the late 1990s, which climaxed with “9-11,” the 
date marking the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, 
D.C. 
Following the Gulf War and the successful liberation of Kuwait in 
1991, the CIA was assigned the task of finding a means to remove 
dictator Saddam Hussein from power while allowing the regime to 
continue in an effort to maintain Iraqi stability in the Gulf.33  Between 
1991 and 1998, the United States reportedly spent more than $100 
million (approximately $20 million per year) in the unsuccessful effort.34  
During the 1990s, CIA covert activities included developing a base in 
Kurdistan for Iraqi and Kurdish dissidents, labeled the Iraqi National 
Congress (INC). The CIA supplied “financing, arms . . . and an implicit 
understanding” 35 that if the INC cover was blown, the United States 
government would assist in bailing them out.36  The United States used 
this base to “gather[] intelligence, coordinate[] propaganda broadcasts, 
and provide[] safe passage for Iraqi military defectors.”37 When Saddam 
sent an army to destroy the base after having learned of the operation 
from spies,38 the CIA was able to extract scores of friendly Iraqi agents.  
 
 31. Id. at 26. (“[T]here is no way to graft secret political action onto the body politic in a 
system that rests upon consent.”) 
 32. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 33. See The CIA-War in Iraq, at http://www.englisch.schule.de/state_of_the_union 
/group3/project/the_cia.htm. (last visited Sept. 14, 2002) 
 34. See id. 
 35. Kevin Fedarko, Saddam’s CIA Coup, Time Magazine, Sept. 23, 1996, at 42 (according to 
surviving witnesses). 
 36. See id. 
 37. Weiner, supra note 21, at A6. 
 38. According to some reports, Saddam’s spies had infiltrated the CIA-run group months 
earlier. See id. 
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However, critics view the CIA as having abandoned many Iraqi agents in 
the withdrawal.39 
This Kurdistan example is one of several covert operations that the 
CIA has conducted in an effort to depose the Iraqi dictator. Aside from 
backing “Kurdish dissidents in the north of Iraq,” the CIA has supported 
“Shiite Muslim groups in the south,” and  “Iraqi exiles in London and 
Iraqi military defectors based in Jordan.”40 Much has been reported in the 
press about the unsuccessful attempts to dethrone Saddam, perhaps 
unfairly. There appears to be a tendency to report about more botched 
missions than successful ones. However, the bottom line, namely that 
Saddam is still in power, speaks for itself. 
It is suggested that the broadest presidential discretion ever bestowed 
upon the CIA in the history of the United States to make use of covert 
operations may involve the current agenda “to destroy Saudi-born 
militant Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network.”41  According to 
the presidential order, the “finding,” which spells out the parameters of 
CIA authority for the operation, the CIA may “do ‘what is necessary to 
bring down Al Qaeda and its leadership.’”42  Though it is premature for 
the public to know details about the kinds of covert activities that are 
currently being conducted to capture bin Laden, the CIA’s budget has 
been cushioned with “more than $1 billion” to facilitate the mission.43 
Though little, if any, concrete information can be confirmed in order to 
protect both Taliban opponents and the United States under the 
“plausible deniability” shield, the United States has not only helped train 
opposition groups such as the Northern Alliance in weaponry, but has 
provided medical supplies, food, and communications equipment in an 
effort to facilitate and coordinate attacks.44  Furthermore, CIA secret 
paramilitary units both on the ground and in the sky over Afghanistan 
(consisting in September 2001 of approximately 150 fighters) have 
assisted rebel forces by providing intelligence which has resulted in 
significant progress and more effective and efficient strikes against the 
 
 39. See Fedarko, supra note 35, at 43. One U.S. official described the mission’s failure when 
Saddam uncovered the covert operation in the following way: “Our entire covert action program has 
gone to hell.”  Id.  According to some experts, thousands of Iraqi agents were left to die, whereas 
government officials claim these reports to be fabrications because “[t]here were never hundreds [or 
thousands of Iraqi CIA agents] to begin with.” See Weiner, supra note 21. 
 40. Tim Weiner, C.I.A. Drafts Covert Plan to Topple Saddam, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1998, at 
A11, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, NY Times file. 
 41. Tabassum Zakaria, CIA gets ‘New Leeway’ to Destroy Bin Laden Covertly, MIDDLE 
EAST TIMES (Oct. 26, 2001), http://www.metimes.com/2K1/issue2001-43/reg/cia_gets_new.htm. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Tabassum Zakaria, Covert CIA Support Seen For Anti-Taliban Forces, at  
http:/www.afghanradio.com/news/2001/october/oct1u2001.html. 
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Taliban.45  Aside from paramilitary units, the CIA is using specialized 
case officers from the Agency’s Near East Division, some of which have 
rekindled previous relationships with rebel forces, including case officers 
who had been active in the 1980s covert Mujaheddin rebels operations, 
to strengthen the anti-Taliban Network. 
While the anti-Al Qaeda operation climaxed with the attacks on U.S. 
soil, President Clinton originally authorized the effort to capture bin 
Laden in the late 1990s, following the bombings of two U.S. embassies 
in East Africa, to which bin Laden had been linked.  Following alleged 
Al Qaeda involvement in the Cole bombing in 2000, even more CIA 
attention was focused on finding, arresting, and if necessary, providing a 
mechanism for killing bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders through 
covert operations.46  While it is probably still early-on in the War on 
Terrorism, and may therefore be premature to judge the effectiveness of 
CIA covert operations, the results have presumably been more successful 
than in missions past.  It should be pointed out that it may in fact be 
premature in almost all covert actions cases to judge the effectiveness of 
the operation due to the very nature of the secrecy involved, and the fact 
that many successes (or successful portions of missions) are not publicly 
released.47 
III.  COVERT ACTION DEFINED 
For an operation to qualify as “covert,” covert actors must proceed in 
a hidden or disguised manner, so that if the action is discovered, the 
actors can deny responsibility because there is no evidence to prove their 
involvement.48  The buzzword for this shield from accountability in the 
trade of covert activities is “plausible deniability.”49  The term “covert 
action” is used interchangeably with “special activities,” perhaps to do 
away with the negative stigma accompanying the former label.50 Critics 
claim that “covert action” is too mild of a characterization of the 
activities involved and should more appropriately be termed “secret 
 
 45. Bob Woodward, Secret CIA Units Playing a Central Combat Role, WASH. POST, Nov. 
18, 2001, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/CIA18.html. 
 46. See Zakaria, supra note 41.  (“While the order allowed the covert operation to contribute 
to Bin Laden’s death, that does not mean the CIA would actually kill him, but the spy agency could 
prompt others to carry out a lethal attack.”) (quoting unnamed sources). 
 47. See Woodward, supra note 45, at A1. As President Bush pointed out just days after the 
attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, “the war might include covert operations, secret 
even in success.” Id. 
 48. JOHN JACOB NUTTER, THE CIA’S BLACK OPS: COVERT ACTION, FOREIGN POLICY AND 
DEMOCRACY 73 (2000). 
 49. MARK M. LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM SECRETS TO POLICY 114-15 (2000). 
 50. Gumina, supra note 29, at 152. 
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warfare,” since the United States has conducted armed hostilities against 
nearly two dozen nations since the end of the First World War “without a 
formal declaration of war.”51  Notwithstanding these taboo 
characterizations and labels, covert actions are official government 
efforts to influence political events in other countries in a concealed 
manner.52  As previously described in this Article, some actions are basic 
in nature (e.g., disrupting a communist rally) while others involve long-
term operations (e.g., combating terrorism in Afghanistan and in other 
countries over a period of years).  Though some authors have sliced 
covert operations into numerous categories,53 at least three different 
kinds of actions comprise “covert actions”: political action, propaganda 
and disinformation, and paramilitary action. 
A. Three Types of Covert Activities 
One of the most common forms of covert operations involves 
political action, which is usually designed to influence political processes 
and voter decisions.  During this type of operation it is common for the 
CIA to provide political advice and training, conduct psychological 
operations known as “psyops,” and to provide financial and non-
monetary subsidies to politicians and organizations.54  For example, the 
CIA not only secretly advised Presidents Diem (Vietnam) and Duarte (El 
Salvador) on how to govern their respective countries in crisis, but also 
provided Russian President Boris Yeltsin with American election 
specialists to help direct the election campaign as recently as the 1990s.55 
Subsidies to individuals and political parties in the form of “goodwill 
gestures” and bribes are also commonplace mechanisms to achieve 
political objectives.  Non-monetary subsidies might include allowing 
foreign governments access to restricted technology under a quid pro quo 
understanding that the recipient government will return the favor. 56  For 
example, in the 1980s, the United States forwarded restricted aircraft 
technology to Saudi Arabia in exchange for Saudi cooperation in 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. One author has included “asset development” and “economic warfare” as at least two 
additional categories. See generally NUTTER, supra note 48, at 75-91. However, this comment 
focuses on the more common types of covert actions and therefore does not address asset 
development and economic warfare. 
 54. See Gumina, supra note 29, at 179. 
 55. See NUTTER, supra note 48, at 79. “Advice” on how to run the country often involved the 
“‘carrot and stick’ approach to stability:” the “carrot” involved “advice [] and money for schools, 
hospitals, and businesses,” while the “stick” involved “how to oppress” tactics such as “police 
operations, riot containment, [and] infiltration of political opponents.” Id. at 80. 
 56. Id at 83. 
EYTH-MACRO 2/5/2003  9:49 AM 
56 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume XVII 
funneling money to Nicaragua.57  Finally, psyops involve some of the 
most creative mechanisms to obtain political objectives.  For example, 
one CIA plan involved dusting the inside of Fidel Castro’s shoes with 
thallium salts, causing him to lose facial hair (a machismo trait in Cuban 
society), and consequently humiliating him in the Latin American 
political arena.58  Other plans involved slipping Castro some LSD, a 
hallucinogenic drug, shortly before he would make a speech to cause him 
to ramble incoherently!59 
Use of propaganda and misinformation is another mechanism 
frequently chosen for covert actions, particularly when coups and 
paramilitary operations are involved.  While the term “propaganda” often 
carries a negative connotation, propaganda does not necessarily have to 
be false information.60  Information employed may be true, false, 
misleading, or technically or partially correct.  Propaganda is commonly 
separated into three different shades—white, gray and black—and is 
labeled according to the source of the information.  White propaganda is 
based on public statements, such as when government officials make 
statements or issue press releases.61  The source of gray propaganda is 
neutral, such as a newspaper reporter of an uninvolved country.  In this 
case, a greater degree of credibility is established because of the third 
party source, even though the information may have actually originated 
with the CIA.62  One example of gray propaganda occurred during the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait when a book was published about the atrocities 
allegedly committed by Iraqi troops.63  Few knew, however, at the time 
the book was published that the book was actually subsidized by the 
Kuwaiti government.  Finally, black propaganda, also known as 
“disinformation,” involves the fabrication of information that appears to 
come from another source through means such as falsified documents, 
video or audiotapes, and radio broadcasts that appear to originate with 
the target.64  Some examples of fabricated documents include ones 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. Other plans included spreading the word in Cuba of the Second Coming of Christ and 
subsequently firing star shells over Cuba from submarines on the “predicted” day! Id. 
 60. Id. at 84. 
 61. Id. This occurs when, for example, the USIA releases a statement, the underlying 
objective of which is to persuade a foreign government or population of something.  White 
propaganda is usually (but not necessarily) true because it is used to build credibility. Id. at 84-85. 
 62. Id. at 85-86. 
 63. The book was entitled The Rape of Kuwait and involved “a lurid account of the atrocities 
committed by Iraqi troops when they invaded the tiny country . . . [including a] vivid account of 
babies ripped from their incubators and dashed on the floor, splashed in painful detail before the 
American public.”  This information was in fact false. Id. 
 64. Id. at 86. 
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produced by the KGB, the main Soviet security and intelligence 
agency,65 which “prove” that the U.S. government was involved in a 
1980s conspiracy to kill off African-Americans and to depopulate Third 
World countries by creating and spreading the AIDS virus!66 
Paramilitary actions are a third means to direct covert operations.  
This mechanism is the most glorified and spectacular version,67 probably 
due to its usually violent and exceedingly daring nature compared to 
other covert operations.68  Some forms of paramilitary actions include 
supporting guerilla wars and supporting coup d’etats.  Recent examples 
of paramilitary action include terrorist activities conducted under the 
direction of Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network.  Those 
activities include anonymous embassy bombings, hijackings and 
bombings of civilian aircrafts, hostage seizures, kidnappings and political 
assassinations.69  Governments like the Taliban often provide the tools to 
carry out such operations, including financing (i.e., Hawala networking), 
intelligence, arms and training, which are assets and means that bin 
Laden and his network used to support the attacks on America. 
B.  Legal Authority to Conduct Covert Actions 
While there is relatively little qualm in government over the legal 
definition of covert action which is set forth in the National Security Act 
of 1947 (NSA),70 issues have been continuously raised over the extent to 
which the CIA must consult the legislative branch of government before 
proceeding.  The legislation fails to expressly authorize or deny covert 
 
 65. The KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, or The Committee for State Security) 
existed from March 13, 1954 until its dissolution on November 6 1991.  See 
http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/KGB 
 66. Id. A less spectacular fabrication involves the CIA producing extra invitations to a 
communist “invitation only” reception for Soviet officials in Mexico, which not only resulted in 
chaos but also caused the hosts to run out of food and drink, forcing them to shut the doors and keep 
“invited” individuals out. Consequently, the bond between local Mexican and Soviet communists 
was strained, as the Soviet guests perceived the hosts to be incompetent.  Id. at 87. 
 67. Hollywood has been producing movies on this type of covert action for decades.  Some 
examples of movies include Navy Seals and Clear and Present Danger. 
 68. One author has suggested that there is a direct relationship between the amount of 
violence the mechanism requires and the potential success in being able to ensure plausible 
deniability: While paramilitary operations often include increased violence, it becomes more 
difficult to hide behind the plausible deniability shield.  Conversely, where violence is at a minimum 
(like in a propaganda operation), plausible deniability increases. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 49, at 
115. 
 69. See NUTTER, supra note 48, at 90. 
 70. Section 503(e) of the NSA defines covert action as “an activity or activities of the United 
States Government to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad, where it is 
intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged 
publicly.” 50 U.S.C. § 503(e) (1994). 
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operations and merely describes the authority of the CIA in very general 
terms.  The Act provides: 
In the Director’s capacity as head of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
the Director shall- 
(1) collect intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate 
means, except that the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law 
enforcement powers or internal security functions; 
(2) provide overall direction for the collection of national intelligence 
through human sources by elements of the intelligence community 
authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination with other 
agencies of the Government which are authorized to undertake such 
collection, ensure that the most effective use is made of resources and 
that the risks to the United States and those involved in such collection 
are minimized; 
(3) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to the national security 
and provide appropriate dissemination of such intelligence; 
(4) perform such additional services as are of common concern to the 
elements of the intelligence community, which services the Director of 
Central Intelligence determines can be more efficiently accomplished 
centrally; and 
(5) perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence 
affecting the national security as the President or the National Security 
Council may direct.71 
The most controversial section of the law involves Section 102(d)(5) 
which states that the Agency is “to perform such other functions and 
duties related to intelligence affecting the national security.”72  While 
some have argued that this clause is sufficiently broad to include 
conducting covert activity without congressional notification, approval, 
and oversight, a former CIA general counsel and drafter of the NSA has 
suggested that the clause does not extend such broad authority.73  
Following NSA enactment, the CIA conducted numerous covert 
operations without congressional approval. Alleged abuses of discretion 
in these operations led to the passage of several amendments to enhance 
congressional oversight. 
While appropriations statutes were passed to ensure that the 
executive branch would respect Congress’ power of the purse by only 
spending lawful appropriations on covert actions, Section 504 of the 
 
 71. 50 U.S.C. §403-3(d). The Act was slightly amended and recodified in 1992 and 1993. 
 72. See Wise, supra note 16, at 5-6 (emphasis added). 
 73. See Gumina, supra note 29, at 162-163. 
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NSA also made it illegal for the CIA to obtain funds from other 
sources.74  Congress stripped the CIA of more discretionary power via 
the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 (now repealed) and the 
Congressional Oversight Act of 1980 (COA) (which amended Hughes-
Ryan). “Section 501 [of the COA] required the CIA director . . . to ‘fully 
and currently inform’ Congress ‘of all intelligence activities’ of the U.S. 
government . . . [including] ‘intelligence operations in foreign 
countries’ . . . [in a timely manner], except in times of extreme national 
emergency.”75 Hughes-Ryan and the Congressional Oversight Act were 
later amended in the new Section 503 of the NSA in 1991,76 the wording 
of which is similar to that of the previous law.  In relevant part, the new 
Section 503 differs with respect to the president’s reporting requirements 
in that the president does not need to report the plan to conduct a covert 
action prior to proceeding if “‘extraordinary circumstances’ affecting 
vital U.S. national interests exist, [and if he] ‘fully informs the 
intelligence committees in a timely fashion.’”77 The president is also 
required to provide Congress with a statement of reasons for failing to 
secure approval before commencing.78  However, the Oversight Act 
provided for a controversial loophole in that the executive is only 
required to report “important” covert activities, leaving it up to the 
discretion of the President not to report what he considers to be  
“unimportant” covert activity.79  Since the law fails to define what 
qualifies as an important covert action, another set of exceptions has 
been created which the president may employ,80 arguably limiting the 
ability of the two established oversight committees of Congress81 to 
attack executive findings and consequent “important” CIA covert 
activities authorized by the president.82 
Aside from Congress’ legislative enactments, presidents have issued 
several National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), 
commonly referred to in the intelligence community as “Nonskids,” 
which address the scope of the CIA’s, and vicariously the NSC’s, 
activities.83  Not surprisingly, the tendency for presidents has been to 
 
 74. Id. at 164. 
 75. Id. at 165 (emphasis added)(quoting 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1994)). 
 76. 50 U.S.C. § 413(b)(a) (1994). 
 77. Gumina, supra note 29, at 179-80. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See NUTTER, supra note 48, at 304. 
 80. Id. 
 81. The two oversight committees are the Select Committee on Intelligence in the Senate and 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the House of Representatives. 
 82. See Accountability and Oversight, at http://www.access.gpo.gov/intelligence/int 
/int018.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2002). 
 83. See Wise, supra note 16, at 9. 
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broaden the scope of executive authority over time, as evidenced in the 
nature of two commonly referred-to orders drafted by Presidents Carter 
and Reagan.  While Carter’s Order 12,036 (now repealed) limited the 
CIA’s role to solely overseas activities, the Reagan Order 12,333 not 
only permits the agency to conduct covert activities abroad, but also 
broadly defines “special activities” as those “conducted in support of 
national foreign policy objectives.”84  The broad scope of NSA duties is 
set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 401-1.12(d)(1), which states that the U.S. foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence elements shall be responsible for: 
[c]ollection, production and dissemination of military and military-
related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence . . . with guidance 
from the Director of Central Intelligence.  Collection of national 
foreign intelligence, not otherwise obtainable, outside the United States 
shall be coordinated with the CIA, and such collection within the 
United States shall be coordinated with the FBI. 
Furthermore, the statute provides under 1.1(b) that “[a]ll means, 
consistent with applicable United States law and this Order, and with full 
consideration of the rights of United States persons, shall be used to 
develop intelligence information for the President and the National 
Security Council.” 
 Since the order does not explicitly preclude or provide authority 
for the executive to make use of covert operations under the “all means” 
language, the relatively vague nature of such (now codified) directives 
added even more fuel to the controversial debate between Congress and 
the executive over (1) the amount, if any, of necessary disclosure to 
Congress, and (2) the fashion and scope of covert activities.  While 
congressional oversight is addressed in the order, it merely requires the 
CIA to “cooperate with Congress ‘to the extent provided by law,’” 85 
which, absent further guidance, leaves the door open for significant 
presidential discretion. 
Although the amendments and directives issued since the creation of 
the NSA and the CIA were intended to provide greater clarity to the 
process of authorizing and conducting covert operations within legal 
parameters, the ultimate dichotomy in interests, and consequent ongoing 
debate over whether the NSA reflects a shared powers theory (or whether 
covert operations are within the inherent purview of the executive 
branch) continues.  The language of the statute still lacks clarity, and 
both sides continue to make arguments that on the one hand, there is an 
 
 84. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401(3.4)(h) 
(1994). 
 85. Conrad, supra note 15, at 980 (emphasis added) (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,333, 50 
U.S.C. § 401 (1982)). 
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express requirement for the CIA to inform Congress of covert operations 
within a reasonable time of commencing them, while the exceptions to 
the rule include such open-ended language, that it is hard to imagine an 
exception into which the CIA could not squeeze a non-reported covert 
activity (e.g., whether a covert activity qualifies as “important”). 
IV.   ARE UNILATERAL COVERT OPERATIONS UN-DEMOCRATIC AND 
THUS UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
While Congress pursues its interests in sharing control over whether 
to launch secret missions under the balance of powers doctrine, the 
public interest represented vicariously through Congress may not be 
neglected.  Besides the difficulty in drafting clear and mutually 
acceptable86 legislation which provides for predictable application of 
covert operation law, the ongoing debate over the legitimacy of covert 
activities is founded upon perhaps the most fundamental idea that the 
United Sates political system represents: democracy.  By allowing the 
CIA to point the finger at another source (i.e., maintaining “plausible 
deniability”), covert operations effectively impair government 
accountability, leaving certain individuals and agencies without an 
obligation to answer to anyone87 unless Congress’ approval is sought.  It 
appears that, at least with respect to making use of paramilitary 
operations to overthrow governments (which has been considered by 
Congress to be essentially “undeclared war”), commencing covert 
activities solely at the executive branch’s discretion is arguably 
unconstitutional.88  “Congress and the public, which Congress represents, 
have no opportunity to debate or approve such operations in advance.”89  
The arguments for and against making use of covert operations absent 
congressional review are separated into at least two views: the idealist 
and the pragmatist.90 
A.  The Idealist Approach: A Narrow View of Democracy 
The idealist view with respect to the legitimacy of unilaterally 
commencing covert activities is unambiguous.  Since democracy rests on 
the consent of the governed, and the governed are unable to approve, 
disapprove, or even comment on the government activity in question, the 
essence of democracy is not served.  Quite to the contrary, unilateral 
 
 86. Acceptable, that is, to both the executive and congressional branches of government. 
 87. See NUTTER, supra note 48, at 305. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Wise, supra note 16, at 25. 
 90. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 49, at 113. 
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decision-making by one branch, without the knowledge of the other 
branches, upsets the American doctrine of checks and balances—the 
pillars upon which the United States government rests—and arguably 
runs blatantly afoul of the legislative intent expressed by the Framers of 
the Constitution. 
Extremists even go so far as to argue that the allegedly unchecked 
CIA executive power to engage in covert operations reflects the political 
agenda of a supremacist government!  Arguments—probably surpassing 
the paranoia threshold—have been made pointing out that the CIA is so 
involved in international as well as domestic civilian life that the “people 
will have to get over their 1984 fear that Big Brother is watching.”91  
According to one author, absent a real check on CIA activity, 
“[p]olitically, [the United States] is plainly and simply a dictatorship.  
This is as complete a dictatorship as ever existed in history . . . . Hitler 
had no more power than John F. Kennedy.”92 
A more even-keeled and less propagandistic advocate of the idealist 
view might argue that such unilateral decision-making not only runs 
contrary to the democratic principles upon which the United States was 
founded, but that the fiascos that have surfaced following the exposure of 
unsuccessful secret operations have proven extremely costly in terms of 
public confidence in government, both domestically and internationally.  
Domestically, the confidence of U.S. citizens was gravely shaken 
following the Watergate scandal, the impeachment vote of the House, 
and subsequently the first resignation of a president while in office in 
nearly 200 years. 
On an international scale, foreign countries may not only argue that 
conducting international covert activities runs contrary to international 
law, but that it has tainted the United States’ reputation as a result of both 
successful and failed operations.  For instance, a global awareness that 
the U.S. participates in covert activities has led other countries in some 
instances to jump to the conclusion that the CIA was involved in 
operations in which it had not actually taken part,93 providing further fuel 
to already fiery relationships with some foreign countries.  Third party 
countries94 (“TPCs”) might also criticize the United States for acting 
hypocritically with respect to western democratic standards under its 
unilateral approach to covert activities. TPCs may feel that moving 
 
 91. Blanche Wiesen Cook, Surveillance and Mind Control, in UNCLOAKING THE CIA 188 
(Howard Frazier ed., 1978). 
 92. Id. at 189. 
 93. See Wise, supra note 16, at 26. 
 94. Third parties are those countries which are not directly affected by the covert activities 
conducted by the United States but which are contemporaneously or subsequently made aware of 
U.S. clandestine involvement in another country. 
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forward with such operations without consulting nations that may have at 
least an indirect interest in the missions (especially in light of 
globalization marked by international treaties and alliances advocating 
cooperation among countries) legitimizes TPCs’ concerns that the United 
States is in essence trying to police (or more bluntly stated, “dominate”) 
the world without taking into consideration the interests of neighboring 
countries.  It has been argued that such operations are in direct violation 
of the charter of the United Nations.95  Consequently, the argument goes, 
democratic principles should not only be served on a domestic scale (i.e., 
balanced between legislative, executive and judiciary branches), but on 
an international one (i.e., through the United Nations) as well. 
In sum, the idealist view strongly opposes the idea of unilateral 
covert activity due to the theoretical inconsistency with the concept of 
democracy inherent to secret missions, the practical blunders that have 
resulted from some disclosed operations (“the historical record [of which 
simply do] not justify covert intervention”),96 and the bad reputation that 
the United States will have to combat in light of possible international 
law violations.  As one dire critic of U.S. covert operations explains: 
The standard of “plausible deniability” has no place in the American 
constitutional system.  For in plain language it means that the 
government can act as it pleases if it can get away with lying about its 
activities . . . . Covert operations have not proved workable in the 
American system; they are like a transplant rejected by the democratic 
host.97 
B.  Responding to the Idealist: Paying Homage to Democratic Principles 
and the Pragmatist Approach 
Pragmatic arguments rely on the premise that despite some 
legitimate interests and points raised by the idealist perspective, “the 
self-interest [regarding national security] of a state occasionally makes 
covert action necessary and legitimate,”98 even if absolute democratic 
principles will arguably be blurred.  However, an argument can first be 
made that democratic principles are indeed served via the procedure that 
the executive must employ before proceeding with the operation.  Even if 
the critic is not satisfied that covert actions are indeed legitimate and 
democratic, there are still valid arguments that can be made to support 
the theory that where the president is acting to protect “national security 
 
 95. See Wise, supra note 16, at 25. 
 96. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 49, at 113. 
 97. See Wise, supra note 16, at 26 (emphasis added). 
 98. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 49, at 113. 
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interests,” such an objective, if pursued in good faith, effectively trumps 
the idealists’ democracy argument, even absent prior congressional 
review. 
1.  Serving democratic principles: procedure involved in conducting 
covert operations 
A first defense to the argument that democracy is compromised in 
the way the CIA conducts covert operations is apparent when taking into 
consideration the fact that although the public is not directly involved in 
the decision-making process, the public is represented through the 
presidential election process and through its representatives in 
Congress.99  Prior to voting for a presidential candidate, the public may 
participate in a number of activities, such as viewing presidential 
debates, to get a sense of how a potential executive officer is likely to 
conduct covert operations.  In addition, the public has the option of not 
re-electing the president within four years if it feels that the president has 
not lived up to its expectations. 
Furthermore, as described above in the legislative definition and 
scope of covert operations, the executive does have the duty, absent 
exigent circumstances, to report the intention to conduct covert activities 
before proceeding.100  The public, represented through both houses of 
Congress (through democratic elections of representatives and senators), 
is therefore at least indirectly consulted in the effort to ensure the 
existence of a  system of checks and balances.  Obviously, sharing 
classified information with a congressional population of more than 500 
people would be ludicrous due to the great potential for leaks.  Therefore, 
the number of people to whom this information can be disclosed is 
limited.101 As part of the Intelligence Oversight Act passed in May of 
1980, one committee from the Senate and one from the House would 
serve as the information contact point between the executive and the 
legislature.102  Thus, with two congressional committees to review 
executive decisions to pursue covert operations, presidential discretion is 
 
 99. As a government agent points out, “[i]ntelligence agencies . . . are institutions within a 
democratic form of government, responsible not only to the President, but to the elected 
representatives of the people, and, ultimately, to the people themselves.  They are funded by the 
American taxpayers.”  See Accountability and Oversight, supra note 82. 
 100. See supra Part III.B. 
 101. PETER HACKES ET AL., FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: LEGAL AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROLS 6 
(1980) (transcript of a symposium sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, and held on December 11, 1979). 
 102. See id. at 6. See also Allan E. Goodman & Bruce D. Berkowitz, Background Paper to 
THE NEED TO KNOW: THE REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON COVERT 
ACTION AND AM. DEMOCRACY 65 (1992). 
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limited, as provided for under the Constitution and fundamental norms of 
democratic government. 
Despite the theoretical satisfaction of democratic principles via the 
discussed procedural guidelines, critics argue that congressional 
oversight is merely a myth in practice because first, both representatives 
and senators allegedly avoid intelligence briefings on covert operations, 
and second, because the process is so tainted by political bipartisanship 
that “every covert action is seen as an opportunity to score political 
points.”103  Critics point to representatives’ and senators’ fears of (1) 
accidental disclosure of classified information potentially resulting in 
somebody’s death and (2) being blamed for a leak and thus being held at 
least partly accountable for a covert operations fiasco.104  In addition, 
presidential fear of allowing one’s political adversary to know and then 
possibly to leak such information to gain political advantage has resulted 
in non-disclosure of covert operations, even to congressional 
committees.105 
Directly related to the latter point is probably the critics’ strongest 
argument—that oversight committees are limited because they have no 
way to verify the information shared by the executive about covert 
operations.  In other words, the CIA can select what, if anything, the 
agency wants to disclose, and Congress has little choice but to accept the 
information.106  Thus, the argument goes, while democracy might be 
served in theory, the reality is another story. 
2.  The pragmatist approach: a practical view of democracy 
However, even assuming that the idealist advocate of democratic 
principles is not convinced that the process the executive must follow in 
notifying Congress of planned covert activity truly reflects a democratic 
process, the critical reality of the situations in which covert operations 
are called upon may be such that it is in the best interest of global 
democracy and both American and non-U.S. lives to bend the reporting 
requirement in a way that still passes constitutional and statutory 
muster.107  While even the idealist108 will concede that there are 
 
 103. See NUTTER, supra note 48, at 307. 
 104. Id. at 306. 
 105. Id. at 307. 
 106. Id. (“Without a separate agency to gather, analyze, and report information regarding 
covert activity, Congress is blind.”) 
 107. Even the former chairman of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government 
Secrecy during the mid-1990s, Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, recognized the need for heightened 
executive secrecy with respect to the related, yet distinct, topic of domestic secret activities (i.e., 
FBI) when he stated: “Would you prefer not to be protected from terrorists? . . . Inevitably in the 
[terrorist] crisis we are in – and it will be a prolonged one – there will be more secrecy.”  See Miles 
EYTH-MACRO 2/5/2003  9:49 AM 
66 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume XVII 
compelling reasons to keep covert missions from the public, and that 
therefore restricting the number of reportees within Congress is a fair and 
necessary compromise (if done in good faith), there are some 
“important” situations in which the value of keeping Congress initially 
uninformed preempts the need to strictly adhere to timely reporting 
requirements under the Oversight Act. 
The main concern, as briefly discussed above, is the risk that 
congressional reportees are unable to keep the information confidential.  
Most commonly classified information makes its way to the public as 
well as to enemy nations via leaks to the press, including situations 
recently addressed by President Bush and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld 
with respect to the War on Terrorism.109  Aside from, but related to, the 
leakage problem is the argument that granting the executive more 
discretionary power to conduct unilateral covert operations includes the 
need to use literally all possible means to protect the United States from 
(then) communist and (now) terrorist threats, even if such action would 
mean to test the legal boundaries set forth in the law and granted under 
the Constitution.110 Next, the need to be able to react quickly and without 
delay is often imperative for successful missions.  Furthermore, and in 
response to the above argument that covert operations potentially violate 
international norms, there is no international law that proscribes covert 
operations; rather, there is evidence that some foreign leaders may 
actually prefer the United States to conduct some operations covertly. 
However, the seminal argument for limiting congressional oversight 
is that not only members of Congress, but vicariously their staff and 
other Capitol Hill affiliates, will expose an ongoing covert operation, 
thereby compromising the objectives of the operation, and more 
importantly, human lives.  As former Director of the CIA William Colby 
pointed out in a public debate, even in the 1770s, when there were only 
about sixty members of Congress (compared to today’s more than 500), 
the Constitution’s Framers recognized the fundamental “leakage” 
problem. According to Mr. Colby, a congressional committee 
refused to release some information about our intelligence activities 
because it said that “fatal experience had shown that there were too 
many members of Congress to keep secrets” . . . . You cannot conduct 
 
Benson, A New Cast of Hawks and Doves Debate Government Secrecy in War on Terrorism, at 
http://www.newhouse.com/archive/story1a012502.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2002). 
 108. The idealist viewpoint is perhaps most poignantly represented by some civil libertarians, 
who have admitted through American Civil Liberties Union legislative counsel Tim Edgar that some 
“‘very sensitive information’ . . . must be kept secret.”  Id. 
 109. See infra notes 112 and 113. 
 110. NUTTER, supra note 48, at 300-01. (“The Constitution, it would often be remarked, is not 
a suicide pact.  In essence, the Constitution could be suspended. . . .”). 
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covert action in that situation because . . .  one man has the power to 
frustrate the whole thing.111 
Such leaks may be inadvertent or deliberate and may be for the most 
nearsighted and politically egocentric reasons, including trying to 
embarrass the president or the CIA, gaining political support by blaming 
the party for a mishap, and even criticizing a successful operation for 
which the president (for good cause) may not have strictly adhered to 
legislative guidelines but arguably remained within constitutional and 
statutory legal bounds. 
The issue of leaks to the press recently surfaced again with respect to 
the War on Terrorism, when President Bush accused congressional 
members of breaching their responsibility to keep classified information 
confidential and thereby “[putting U.S.] troops at risk.”112  Following a 
presidential order which reduced the disclosure of classified information 
to an eight-person parliamentary panel for an indefinite period of time, 
Democratic Senator Tom Daschle reacted by acknowledging that such 
leaks are unacceptable and need to be stopped because they damage 
collaboration between congressional and executive branches of 
government.113 
As pointed out earlier in this Article, the status of world politics 
during times of war and peace plays a significant role in assessing not 
only the need for—and scope of—covert activity, but whether Congress 
should be consulted in the decision making process.  During the Cold 
War, the United States considered the threat of “monolithic international 
communism” (founded on the Soviet Union model) to be so imminent 
and multifaceted that the need to justify the use of covert operations did 
not arise.114  In fact, Congress basically acquiesced to executive actions 
 
 111. See HACKES ET AL., supra note 101, at 6 (internal quotations omitted).  Aside from 
congressional members, other potential culprits include 23,000 Pentagon employees, millions of 
military personnel, and “any number of thousands of people who can and will give background 
briefings to reporters.”  See a statement made by Ms. Victoria Clarke, Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Public Affairs, “Classified Leaks Have ‘Dropped Considerably’” at http://www.fas.org/sgp 
/news/2002/01/press.html (Jan. 9, 2002). 
 112. See “Drive to plug leaks sidelines Congress,” at http://old.smh.com.au/news/0110/11 
/world/world10.html (Oct. 11, 2001).  Though the White House did not specify what information 
was leaked to the press, a congressional aide pointed the finger at a Washington Post article 
identifying intelligence officials’ disclosures about imminent additional Osama bin Laden terrorist 
attacks.  Id. 
 113. Id.  Additional leaks were addressed in a radio broadcast by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld 
in which he accused unnamed sources of violating federal criminal laws by leaking classified 
information to the public, as well as consequently hindering U.S. intelligence gathering activities, as 
sources have dried up when confidentiality of the information was breached.  See Defense Secretary 
Rumsfeld Roundtable with Radio Media, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2002/01/dod011502.html 
(Jan. 15, 2002). 
 114. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 49, at 113. 
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and rarely second-guessed unilateral decisions to conduct covert 
activities.115 
While some have argued that the need for covert action has dwindled 
since the foundation of the communist threat largely dissipated following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union,116 the recent terrorist attacks 
experienced in the United States, a geographic area considered by many 
to be insulated from significant direct hits, has quickly revived the 
pragmatist advocates’ theory in support of the need to conduct purely 
covert operations for national security reasons.  Consequently, critics of 
U.S. covert operations regarding Osama bin Laden and his terrorist 
network, perhaps attributable in part to a fear of being viewed as un-
patriotic,117 have largely been silenced. 
In making use of the most effective and efficient means to thwart the 
growing communist and terrorist cancer, presidents have argued that the 
executive needs to be able to freely pursue a third (or “middle”) option in 
situations in which providing overt military or economic aid for a 
mission fails to adequately achieve the goals of the United States, while 
direct military intervention might carry risks too grave to endure under 
the circumstances of a particular situation.118  Additionally, making use 
of the middle option with the underlying objective of protecting national 
security is even more imperative to combat foreign governments which 
fail to play by American—and, arguably, international—rules and which 
engage in covert political operations of their own, thereby leaving the 
United States no option but to engage in covert operations in an effort to 
learn of some of their potentially damaging secrets.119 
Furthermore, an executive decision to pursue the middle option 
absent prior congressional review provides the president with a means to 
quickly and efficiently conduct foreign policy, largely due to the fact that 
he is not subject to excessive bureaucratic delays or political or public 
debate.  Consequently, absent the typically cumbersome and time-
 
 115. Aside from conducting covert operations in support of European countries subject to a 
more imminent geographic threat, the threat to the United States became even more of a priority 
upon the spread and increase in popularity of communism in the Western Hemisphere.  Hence, the 
U.S. pursued covert operations in Cuba to destabilize Castro, who provided the Soviets with a base 
dangerously close to U.S. soil.  Additionally, Chile, with its newly (and ironically) democratically 
elected communist leader, Allende, posed another threat due to Chile’s friendly relations with Castro 
and other communist allies. See id. at 113-14. 
 116. See NUTTER, supra note 48, at 330. 
 117. According to Roger Hamburg, a political science professor at Indiana University, “I 
worry because the public is scared, and anything seems justified in the name of combating 
terrorism.”  See Benson, supra note 107. 
 118. E.g., RICHARD NIXON, 1999: VICTORY WITHOUT WAR 109 (1988). 
 119. See HACKES ET AL., supra note 101, at 3. See also Goodman & Berkowitz, supra note 
102, at 41. 
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consuming process of receiving congressional approval,120 the interests 
of American agents and the public are best served by minimizing costs 
(in terms of avoiding red tape)121 and risks (in terms of lives at stake) via 
this foreign policy tool that allows for timely and protected steps in 
reaction to an imminent national security threat.122 
Despite the fact that some initially un-reviewed covert operations 
have not been successful, it is undisputed that many such activities have 
enjoyed significant success, thereby resulting in favorable public review 
and increased national security.  However, many such successes (as well 
as failures, although unsuccessful missions are more likely to surface in 
the press) have not become public due to the agency’s ability to keep 
many  missions undisclosed even after completion.  Some disclosed 
successes have been addressed above and include infiltrating and 
thwarting anti-terrorist as well as drug activities as recently as several 
weeks ago when the CIA uncovered evidence of follow-up terrorist plots 
to the 9-11 attacks.  Other success stories include funding democratic 
leaders and political parties against communist-backed, radical, or 
fundamentalist regimes around the world (most notably against the 
Soviet Union before and after the Cold War).  More recently, covert 
operations have been successfully utilized to track down and hold 
individuals responsible for the financial backing of the Al Qaeda terrorist 
organization (i.e., the Hawala network), without which terrorist 
organizations’ plots would be crippled or at least significantly thwarted.  
Although it is impossible to come up with an accurate success/failure 
ratio due to the fact that many activities on both ends of the spectrum 
simply do not surface, the mere fact that “successive presidents continue 
to use covert action” 123 indicates that the ratio favors making use of 
covert activities, 124 both those that are and those that are not initially 
reviewed by the appropriate committees. 
In response to the global democracy argument that the United States 
is violating international standards by conducting covert activities in 
TPCs or in countries which have an indirect effect on TPCs (with or 
without the knowledge of TPCs’ government officials), it can be argued 
 
 120. For example, the War Powers Act requires the president to acquire congressional 
permission if American troops are involved in a conflict anywhere in the world for more than 60 
days. See Goodman & Berkowitz, supra note 102, at 42. 
 121. As former Director of Central Intelligence, Hoyt S. Vandenberg pointed out during a 
hearing before the Senate Service Committee, making use of covert operations would be far more 
efficient and less costly because the CIA would not have to “rely on the painstaking study of . . . 
available overt material” and could “avoid ‘wasteful duplication’” in its research and analysis of 
intelligence information. See Wise, supra note 16, at 7-8. 
 122. See Goodman & Berkowitz, supra note 102, at 42. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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that there is no international sanction for covert activities, unless, for 
example, the United States pursues covert operations in a particular 
fashion (e.g., in uniform) in which case a targeted country “may consider 
the [operation] an act of war.”125  Therefore, as long as the covert activity 
can be qualified so as not to fall within the purview of the Charter of the 
United Nations definition, international law does not present an 
additional obstacle for the United States to overcome in its cause. 
In fact, there have been cases in which foreign nations have actually 
welcomed U.S. use of covert activity over the alternatives.  For example, 
when the Pakistani government was serving as a conduit for U.S. arms to 
Afghan rebels, the desire to maintain operational secrecy was mutual.  
The Pakistani government did not want its relationship with the United 
States revealed due to potential political complications with neighboring 
countries.126  With respect to the terrorist attacks since 9-11, however, 
there is no need for Pakistan to request that its receipt of U.S. aid be kept 
secret, since the Pakistani government officially and actively supports the 
war against terrorism, including the support of anti-Taliban fighters (i.e., 
Northern Alliance) in Afghanistan. 
In sum, both idealist and pragmatist advocates make valid arguments 
to support their respective positions.  While on the one hand the idealist 
correctly points out that the democratic principles that the United States 
was founded upon will necessarily be violated by the inherent nature of 
secret operations (i.e., no check or balance by the public or other 
branches of government), the discussion turns on what circumstances 
permit the executive to temporarily or permanently escape from absolute 
democratic principles, where a derogation therefrom may be in the 
nation’s (and possibly the world’s) security interest.  Reasonable minds 
can differ on where to strike the balance between narrowly adhering to 
the democratic theory and recognizing the practical need to exceed 
idealist democratic parameters within the purview of the law.  Since the 
ultimate authority to protect the United States rests with the executive 
branch directed by the president as set forth in the Constitution,127 the 
CIA should be allowed to continue conducting important covert 
operations, even if Congress or the public is not consulted before 
commencing the activities.  The effectiveness of the operation and safety 
of the persons involved would be compromised by involving more 
people than necessary in order to satisfy a mere reporting requirement, 
and the benefit derived from secret intelligence gathering would be lost 
or at least minimized, needlessly putting innocent lives at risk both in the 
 
 125. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 49, at 116. 
 126. See Goodman & Berkowitz, supra note 102, at 43. 
 127. See Wise, supra note 16, at 25. 
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United States and abroad.  Therefore, the balance weighs in favor of 
allowing the executive to conduct covert operations without the need to 
receive permission from another source in all circumstances when the 
United States is at war, and even in times of peace where a threat may 
nevertheless be imminent. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
The debate over covert operations between Congress, the executive 
and the public regarding the president’s scope of authority to conduct the 
activities absent initial or timely review by Congress is relatively recent 
compared to the number of years that presidents have been using this 
foreign policy tool.  While the executive branch was rarely challenged in 
its decisions to go forward with a variety of covert activity methods for 
nearly 200 years, Congress sensed that its position was being 
compromised after alleged abuses of CIA authority surfaced.  In an effort 
to reign in the executive in response to questionable covert activities 
during the Cold War128 and beyond, Congress passed legislation to curb 
CIA discretion and to provide for congressional oversight in making 
decisions whether to proceed with operations. 129  In order to preserve the 
very democracy upon which the U.S. system is founded, the democratic 
idealist argues, every covert action must be at least checked by a 
congressional committee or, better yet, by the public directly. 
While it is understandable that congressional oversight or even a 
public hearing is theoretically the best way to ensure that U.S. 
democratic principles are respected by the executive, the latter option is 
unrealistic and the former is difficult under the circumstances of most 
covert operations.  However, it is argued that the way current legislation 
is drafted, there is sufficient wiggle room for the executive to circumvent 
the reporting requirement.  If Congress accepted this argument, there 
would be little consequent debate.  Rather, idealistic advocates argue that 
there is always a reporting requirement (within a reasonable time of 
commencing the operation), which leads to the counterargument that 
there are circumstances (i.e., where immediate action must be taken to 
combat an imminent threat) where protecting the national security 
interest effectively trumps any limiting legislation in this area. 
It is necessary to balance the need to preserve democracy in the 
United States (and to some extent around the world), a process that in 
many circumstances does not leave margin for error (i.e., where lives are 
 
 128. See generally, for example, supra note 16. 
 129. For example, Congress passed legislation requiring the executive to report planned covert 
activity within forty-eight hours in 1991.  See 50 U.S.C. §413b(a)(1). 
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at stake), with the need to strictly adhere to the requirements set forth by 
the oversight statute.  If the CIA, in good faith, believes that lives will be 
put at risk by following a reporting requirement, then the executive 
should be able to apply its constitutionally and legislatively granted 
power to conduct covert operations absent initial congressional review.  
The public still has an opportunity to ensure that fundamental principles 
of democracy are respected in U.S. government by participating in a 
political system in which the most significant government officials (e.g., 
the president, senators, and representatives) are elected and in which the 
public is free not to reelect its representatives for any reason it chooses. 
Although the CIA should not have the right to conduct covert 
operations absent good cause, the public should have faith that elected 
government officers are competent enough to appoint capable and 
proficient staff which can make reasonable decisions on when it is 
imperative that not even the designated congressional committees should 
be made initially aware of covert operations.  While it is difficult to draw 
a bright line beyond which the Executive shall no longer be under an 
obligation to report, the instances when the committees are not informed 
should be kept to a minimum.  However, where both America and 
American agents’ lives are at stake, the Executive will be able to show 
(immediately or later) good cause, and if the action is taken in good faith, 
the Executive should not be second-guessed.  Granting such discretion 
should not be viewed as a violation of democratic principles or of the 
Constitution. 
 
